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I. Introduction 
 
This is the story of the time that Apple broke Zoom, and everybody 
was surprisingly okay with it. The short version is that Zoom provides 
one of the most widely used video-conferencing systems in the world. 
One reason for Zoom’s popularity is its ease of use; one reason Zoom 
was easy to use was that it had a feature that let users join calls with a 
single click. On macOS, Zoom implemented this feature by running a 
custom web server on users’ computers; the server would receive 
Zoom-specific requests and respond by launching Zoom and 
connecting to the call.1 Security researchers realized that that web 
pages could use this feature to join users to Zoom calls without any 
further confirmation on their part, potentially enabling surveillance 
through their webcams and microphones.2 The researchers released a 
proof-of-concept exploit in the form of a webpage that would 
immediately connect anyone who visited it to a Zoom video call with 
random strangers.3 They also sketched out ways in which the Zoom 
server on users’ computers could potentially be used to hijack those 
computers into running arbitrary code.4 
 
After the story came to light, Apple’s response was swift and 
unsparing. It pushed out a software update to macOS to delete the 
 
 
 
 
1 Jonathan Leitschuh, Zoom Zero Day: 4+ Million Webcams & Maybe an RCE? Just Get 
Them to Visit Your Website!, MEDIUM (July 8, 2019), https://medium.com/bugbountywrit 
eup/zoom-zero-day-4-million-webcams-maybe-an-rce-just-get-them-to-visit-your-website-
ac75c83f4ef5 [https://perma.cc/7W3Y-LDHY]. Using a custom local web server bypassed 
security checks ordinarily performed by browsers. Id. See generally Dan Goodin, Zoom for 
Mac Made It Too Easy for Hackers to Access Webcams. Here’s What to Do [Updated], ARS 
TECHNICA (July 9, 2019, 6:33 PM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2019/07/ 
zoom-makes-it-too-easy-for-hackers-to-access-webcams-heres-what-to-do/. 
2 Leitschuh, supra note 1. 
3 Id.; see also Matt Haughey (@mathowie), TWITTER (July 8, 2019, 8:39 PM), 
https://twitter.com/mathowie/status/1148391109824921600 [https://perma.cc/FP4F-EC27] 
(“This Zoom vulnerability is bananas. I tried one of the proof of concept links and got 
connected to three other randos also freaking out about it in real time.”). 
4 Assetnote Team, Zoom Zero Day Followup: Getting the RCE, ASSETNOTE (July 17, 2019), 
https://blog.assetnote.io/bug-bounty/2019/07/17/rce-on-zoom/ [https://perma.cc/M528-7PX9]; 
Leitschuh, supra note 1.  
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Zoom server and prevent it from being reinstalled.5 The update was 
remarkable, and not just because it removed functionality rather than 
adding it. Typical Apple updates to macOS show a pop-up notification 
that lets users choose whether and when to install an update. But 
Apple pushed out this update silently and automatically; users woke up 
to discover that the update had already been installed—if they 
discovered it at all. In other words, Apple deliberately broke an 
application feature on millions of users’ computers without notice or 
specific consent. And then, six days later, Apple did it again.6 
 
There is a lot that could be said about this episode; it illuminates 
everything from responsible disclosure practices7 to corporate public 
relations to secure interface design for omnipresent cameras and 
microphones.8 But I want to dwell on just how strange it is that one 
major technology company (AAPL, market capitalization $1.4 
trillion9) deliberately broke a feature in another major technology 
company’s (ZM, market capitalization $24 billion10) product for 
millions of users, and almost no one even blinked. We are living in a 
William Gibson future of megacorporations waging digital warfare on 
 
 
 
 
5 Dan Goodin, Silent Mac Update Nukes Dangerous Webserver Installed by Zoom, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 10, 2019, 7:50 PM), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2019/07/silent-mac-update-nukes-dangerous-webserver-installed-by-zoom/ 
[https://perma.cc/G2SV-P5DC]; Zack Whittaker, Apple Has Pushed a Silent Mac Update to 
Remove Hidden Zoom Web Server, TECHCRUNCH (July 10, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://techcr 
unch.com/2019/07/10/apple-silent-update-zoom-app/ [https://perma.cc/UD5J-8GEB].  
6 Dieter Bohn, Apple Is Silently Updating Macs Again to Remove Insecure Software From 
Zoom’s Partners, VERGE (July 16, 2019, 1:20 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/16/20 
696529/apple-mac-silent-update-zoom-ringcentral-zhumu-vulnerabilty-patched 
[https://perma.cc/RS87-S6C8].  
7 See ALANA MAURUSHAT, DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY VULNERABILITIES: LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
ISSUES (2013); Kristin M. Bergman, A Target to the Heart of the First Amendment: 
Government Endorsement of Responsible Disclosure as Unconstitutional, 13 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 117 (2015). 
8 See, e.g., Matthew Brocker & Stephen Checkoway, iSeeYou: Disabling the MacBook 
Webcam Indicator LED (Dec. 12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/handle/1774.2/36569 (demonstrating an attack to foil a 
security feature in which an indicator light was lit whenever a Mac’s webcam was turned on). 
9 As of February 11, 2020. Apple Market Cap, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/companies/AAP 
L/market_cap (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).  
10 As of February 11, 2020. Zoom Video Communications Market Cap, YCHARTS, 
https://ycharts.com/companies/ZM/market_cap (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).  
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each other’s software and everyone just accepts that this is how life is 
now. 
 
Lest you think I am dwelling on an isolated and unrepresentative 
incident, here are some further examples of programs doing drive-bys 
on each other like warring street gangs: 
 
● Malware: Antivirus software attempts to prevent malware 
from being installed on users’ computers, and to remove 
that software if found. Malware tries to install itself and 
evade detection and removal, so of course its first order of 
business is often to turn off any antivirus protection.11 
 
● video game bots: Some online game players use bots to 
play the game for them, leveling up their characters and 
obtaining resources.12 Blizzard, which operates the popular 
game World of Warcraft (WoW), added a program called 
Warden to WoW, which detects bots and reports them to 
Blizzard so it can ban their users from connecting to 
Blizzard’s servers.13 One bot maker, MDY, modified its 
code to evade detection by Warden.14 Others developed 
techniques to modify Warden itself and disable its 
surveillance without alerting Blizzard.15 
 
 
 
 
 
11 See, e.g., DoubleAgent: Taking Full Control Over Your Antivirus, CYBELLUM (Mar. 22, 
2017), https://cybellum.com/doubleagent-taking-full-control-antivirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/2BMR-VEY5]; Malware Uses Certificates to Disable the Installation of 
Anti-Malware Solutions on Your Computer, BITDEFENDER, https://www.bitdefender.com/ 
consumer/support/answer/1921/ [https://perma.cc/6N27-E8QK]. 
12 See, e.g., GREG HOGLUND & GARY MCGRAW, EXPLOITING ONLINE GAMES: CHEATING 
MASSIVELY DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 19 (2007).  
13 See, e.g., Andy Chalk, World of Warcraft Bot Factory Gives Up After Massive Blizzard 
Banhammering, PC GAMER (May 15, 2015), https://www.pcgamer.com/world-of-warcraft-
bot-factory-gives-up-after-massive-blizzard-banhammering/ [https://perma.cc/V5RV-H7J4]. 
14 MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2010). 
15 Deceiving Blizzard Warden, HACKMAG, https://hackmag.com/uncategorized/deceiving-
blizzard-warden/ [https://perma.cc/MTA7-K3TS].  
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● Ad blocking: Some websites show ads.16 In response, some 
users install adblockers in their browsers to block the ads 
on websites they visit. In reply, some websites detect when 
ads are being blocked and refuse to display content unless 
the adblockers are disabled. In surreply, some adblockers 
disguise from websites the fact that their ads are being 
blocked. Or, in reply, some websites modify their ads so 
that adblockers cannot detect them, and in surreply 
adblockers use more sophisticated techniques to recognize 
the mutated ads. In the words of Parker Higgins, it is 
“[i]ncreasingly obvious that any debate about adblockers is 
a thin veneer over questions of basic control of 
computers.”17 
 
● Ad injection: Or, maybe it is a browser plugin that shows 
the ads and the website that objects. Today the preferred 
term is “ad injectors”—defined as software “that modifies a 
page's content to insert or replace advertisements, 
irrespective of user consent”18—although readers of a 
certain age may remember the litigation over “popup 
ads.”19 Browser vendors have adopted increasingly 
stringent rules to restrict ad injectors.20  
 
● Browser tracking: Websites use browser APIs, including 
placing cookies on users’ computers, to gather information 
 
 
 
 
16 See generally Russell A. Miller, Liberation, Not Extortion: The Fate of Ad-Blocking in 
German and American Law (Aug. 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn 
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3019254; Grant Storey et al., The Future of Ad Blocking: 
An Analytical Framework and New Techniques (May 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1705.08568.pdf.  
17 Parker Higgins (@xor), TWITTER (Sept. 7, 2015, 5:06 PM), https://twitter.com/xor/status/ 
640994476480069632 [https://perma.cc/9FG2-AEBY].  
18 Kurt Thomas et al., Ad Injection at Scale: Assessing Deceptive Advertisement 
Modifications, in PROC. 2015 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 151, 152 (2015). 
19 E.g., 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). For a more 
modern example, see Halperin v. Int’l Web. Serv., LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d 893 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
20 Nav Jagpal, Out with Unwanted Ad Injectors, GOOGLE SECURITY BLOG (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://security.googleblog.com/2015/03/out-with-unwanted-ad-injectors.html 
[https://perma.cc/BDR9-PWS5]. 
30 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.1 
 
 
about users and track them from page to page and site to 
site. In response, browsers allow users to block or delete 
cookies to prevent websites from recognizing them. In 
reply, websites have deployed ever more sophisticated 
techniques to fingerprint users’ browsers based on other 
features, such as which fonts they have installed21 and the 
characteristics of their computer’s battery.22 Also in reply, 
websites have deployed software techniques to circumvent 
browser-based cookie blocking, for example by simulating 
user input so that browsers think that users had consciously 
interacted with websites.23 In surreply, browser makers 
have removed or restricted the APIs enabling these forms 
of tracking, and take increasingly strong measures against 
websites they identify as circumventing users’ cookie 
settings.24 
 
● Email tracking: Emails can include HTML that refers to 
resources on the web, which has been used for years by 
email senders to see who has opened an email—by 
including an image with a URL unique to a particular 
 
 
 
 
21 E.g., Gunes Acar et al., FPDetective: Dusting the Web for Fingerprinters, in CCS ‘13: 
PROC. 2013 ACM SIGSAC CONF. ON COMP. & COMM. SECURITY 1129, 1130 (2013), 
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2508859.2516674; Peter Eckersley, How Unique Is Your Web 
Browser?, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 1, 4 (Mikhail Atallah & Nicholas Hopper 
eds., 2011). 
22 Łukasz Olejnik et. al., The Leaking Battery: A Privacy Analysis of the HTML5 Battery 
Status API, in DATA PRIVACY MANAGEMENT, AND SECURITY ASSURANCE 254, 254 (Joaquin 
Garcia-Alfaro et al. eds., 2016). 
23 See In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litigation, 806 F.3d 125, 131-32 
(3rd Cir. 2015); Jonathan Mayer, Safari Trackers (Feb. 17, 2012), http://webpolicy.org/2012/0 
2/17/safari-trackers/. 
24 E.g., Bill Buddington, Apple's New WebKit Policy Takes a Hard Line for User Privacy, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEP LINKS (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplink 
s/2019/08/apples-new-webkit-policy-takes-hard-line-user-privacy [https://perma.cc/MPJ5-
5VG6]; Marissa Wood, Today’s Firefox Blocks Third-Party Tracking Cookies and 
Cryptomining by Default, MOZILLA: BLOG (Sept. 3, 2019), 
https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2019/09/03/todays-firefox-blocks-third-party-tracking-cookies-
and-cryptomining-by-default/ [https://perma.cc/TPT9-ABY3]. 
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user.25 If that URL is loaded, the user has opened the email. 
So, of course, some email readers include options not to 
load remote resources unless the user specifically asks to.26 
 
● Jailbreaking: Some operating systems make it difficult or 
impossible to install software not approved by the 
operating-system vendor.27 Unsurprisingly, at the more 
restrictive end there is a market for programs that will 
allow the installation of other programs the operating-
system vendor has attempted to prevent.28 Some of these 
programs are used by device owners who want to 
“jailbreak” their devices to add new programs;29 some are 
used by hackers to surveil users;30 some are used by law 
enforcement to decrypt devices during investigations.31 
What happens when operating-system vendors discover 
that one of these programs is in use? They push out an 
update to the operating system to disable it.32 
 
 
 
 
 
25 E.g., Mike Davidson, Superhuman Is Spying on You, MIKE INDUSTRIES (June 30, 2019), 
https://mikeindustries.com/blog/archive/2019/06/superhuman-is-spying-on-you 
[https://perma.cc/6QBH-LRVQ]. 
26 John Gruber, Superhuman and Email Privacy, DARING FIREBALL (July 23, 2019), 
https://daringfireball.net/2019/07/superhuman_and_email_privacy [https://perma.cc/UQY7-
LCQH].  
27 See, e.g., Safely Open Apps on Your Mac, APPLE (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202491 [https://perma.cc/B3DZ-EPQG]. 
28 E.g., Lily Hay Newman, Unfixable iOS Device Exploit Is the Latest Apple Security 
Upheaval, WIRED (Sept. 27, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/ios-exploit-
jailbreak-iphone-ipad/ [https://perma.cc/6TNH-UDED].  
29 See, e.g., PANGU, http://en.pangu.io.  
30 See, e.g., Ian Beer, A Very Deep Dive into iOS Exploit Chains Found in the Wild, PROJECT 
ZERO (Aug. 29, 2019), https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2019/08/a-very-deep-dive-into-
ios-exploit.html [https://perma.cc/9WY3-GL2G].  
31 E.g., Andy Greenberg, Cellebrite Says It Can Unlock Any iPhone for Cops, WIRED (June 
14, 2019, 6:05 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/cellebrite-ufed-ios-12-iphone-hack-android/ 
[https://perma.cc/D2QH-YQWJ].  
32 E.g., Shaun Nichols, Breaking News: Apple Un-Breaks Break on Jailbreak Break, REGISTER 
(Aug. 26, 2019, 11:38 PM), 
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/08/26/apple_fixes_ios124_jailbreak/ 
[https://perma.cc/TPP9-V9BN]. 
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● Browser certificates: These contain public keys used by 
browsers to verify the identities of websites—thereby 
ensuring that users’ communications with those websites 
are securely encrypted. ISPs in Kazakhstan required users 
to download and install a government-issued certificate, 
potentially allowing the government to eavesdrop on their 
communications with major websites like Facebook and 
Twitter.33 In response, Mozilla, Apple, and Google disabled 
that certificate in their browsers, no matter how it was 
installed.34 
 
● DRM: In the antediluvian pre-streaming days of digital 
music, many users would use “ripping” software to make 
MP3 copies of their CDs on their computers. Sony/BMG 
shipped a number of CDs which installed their own digital 
rights management (DRM) software on PCs in which they 
were inserted.35 This software—XCP and MediaMax CD-
3—prevented common ripping software from reading or 
making copies of Sony/BMG CDs.36 It also modified users’ 
computers in ways designed to make it harder to remove; 
XCP in particular took steps to conceal its presence on 
users’ computers and created additional security 
vulnerabilities that other attackers could use to install their 
own software on users’ computers. Security researchers 
compared this DRM software to “rootkits”: forms of 
malware that actively resist attempts to uninstall them by 
 
 
 
 
33 See RAM SUNDARA RAMAN ET AL., KAZAKHSTAN’S HTTP INTERCEPTION (2019), 
https://censoredplanet.org/kazakhstan [https://perma.cc/72XV-7VAR].  
34 Catalin Cimpanu, Apple, Google, and Mozilla Block Kazakhstan's HTTPS Intercepting 
Certificate, ZDNET (Aug. 21, 2019, 10:00 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/apple-google-
and-mozilla-block-kazakhstans-https-intercepting-certificate/; Sydney Li, Browsers Take a 
Stand Against Kazakhstan’s Invasive Internet Surveillance, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: 
DEEP LINKS (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/browsers-take-stand-
against-kazakhstans-invasive-internet-surveillance [https://perma.cc/5PKT-9R89].  
35 See generally Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the 
Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony/BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1157, 1158 
(2007).  
36 Mark Russinovich, Sony, Rootkits and Digital Rights Management Gone Too Far, MARK’S 
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2005), https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/markrussinovich/2005/10/31/sony-
rootkits-and-digital-rights-management-gone-too-far/ [https://perma.cc/9HLZ-8UX9]. 
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hiding, disabling removal programs, and reinstalling 
themselves if partially removed. 
 
I could go on, but you get the picture.  
One way to make sense of these program-versus-program conflicts 
would be to proceed methodically through the bodies of law that could 
be (and have been) brought to bear on them. But their sheer number is 
stunning. There are statutory computer-misuse claims under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and its state analogs against programs 
that access users’ computers without authorization.37 There are 
property-tort claims for trespass to chattels against programs that harm 
users’ computers.38 There are contractual claims by users against 
programs that break their promises, and tortious interference claims 
against programs that keep other programs from working as 
promised.39 There are copyright claims for modifying programs and 
content in unapproved ways;40 there are trademark claims for passing 
off modifications as the original, and for misrepresenting the 
relationship between a program and its victim.41 Section 1201 of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act42 prohibits circumventing 
technological protections on copyrighted works (including music on 
CDs and games like World of Warcraft),43 and section 1202,44 which 
has been interpreted to prohibit stripping certain kinds of metadata 
from copyrighted works,45 might also sometimes be in play. When a 
program justifies disabling another on the ground that it is harmful—as 
antivirus software does with malware—this justification may itself 
sometimes be actionable as trade libel, or as defamation of its 
 
 
 
 
37 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
38 The leading case on online trespass to chattels, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 
2003), held that the tort did not lie without “some actual injury,” but that requirement will 
typically be satisfied when a defendant “impairs [the] functioning” of a program on the 
plaintiff’s computer. Id. at 300. 
39 E.g., Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F. 3d 1169, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2019).  
40 E.g., MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928, 937 (9th Cir. 2010). 
41 E.g., U-Haul Intern. v. whenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727-29 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
42 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1998).  
43 MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 943-52.  
44 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (1999).  
45 See e.g., Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp., 650 F.3d 295, 305 (2011).  
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developers.46 If the makers of the two programs compete, actions by 
one against the other might violate the antitrust laws.47 Any of the 
above in violation of a privacy policy, or terms of service, or other 
representation to users might be a deceptive trade practice in the view 
of the Federal Trade Commission and state attorneys general.48 Cutting 
across almost all of the above there are some commonly arising 
defenses, such as Section 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency 
Act, which protects “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability” of “objectionable” material.49 And at 
the Constitutional level, restrictions on software functionality can raise 
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment issues. 
 
The length of this list should give pause. If there is a principled way to 
resolve these software-versus-software conflicts, it needs a firmer 
foundation than a mess of doctrinal detail. If these bodies of law reach 
consistent results, we should seek the common thread that explains 
them all. If they reach inconsistent results, we should seek a coherent 
basis to harmonize them. Either way, we need a theory. So I would 
like to come at the problem the other way around: what kinds of 
principles might help sort out these cases? 
 
Part II of this essay describes three seemingly appealing heuristics for 
resolving software conflicts—banning bad software, promoting user 
freedom, and enforcing contracts—each of which fails badly when 
confronted with common fact patterns. Part III argues that the missing 
element is user autonomy: only by connecting software’s effects for 
users with their choices of what software to run and what contracts to 
agree to is it possible to make sense of software conflicts.  
 
II. Software Conflicts 
 
 
 
 
46 See, e.g., NEW.NET v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
47 See e.g., In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
48 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
49 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (1996). 
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Three theories of software conflicts are so straightforward, so 
widespread, and so intuitively appealing that they are often simply 
assumed. The first is that certain program behavior is intrinsically 
harmful and should be prohibited. Programs should not spy on users 
and delete their files. Call this theory “Bad Software Is Bad.” The 
second is that users should be allowed to run whatever software they 
want. Call this theory “Software Freedom.” And the third is that both 
users and software vendors should be held to the terms of whatever 
contracts they enter into. Call this “Click to Agree.” Each theory 
captures an important insight about software but is incomplete on its 
own. Each theory gives good explanations in some easy cases but 
quickly runs into trouble in harder cases. Sometimes the theories 
agree, and sometimes they do not. We can understand much about 
software conflicts by studying the cases where one theory fails and 
another succeeds. We can understand even more by studying the cases 
where all three fall short. 
 
a. Bad Software Is Bad 
 
The first, and in some ways most intuitive, theory focuses on the 
technical characteristics of the software itself. Most programs are 
Good and do useful things for users. But some programs are Bad. 
Programs can be Bad because they harm users by invading their 
privacy and deleting their data, because they harm other people by 
pirating copyrighted works and making pornographic deepfakes, or 
because they harm other programs in all of the ways listed above. The 
legal system should intervene when Bad programs do Bad things, 
including when they disable Good programs. And, a little more subtly, 
the legal system should allow Good programs to disable Bad 
programs. 
 
The underlying intuition here is sound. Some programs really are 
objectively Bad. Spousal spyware can put users in physical danger by 
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enabling abusive partners to stalk them.50 Ransomware that encrypts 
users’ files until they send Bitcoin in exchange for a decryption key is 
also 100% downside: it does nothing good for its victims, ever.51 
Norton AntiVirus is Good;52 NotPetya is Bad.53 It makes perfect sense 
that the former should be allowed to block the latter, just as Bad 
Software Is Bad recommends. A theory that did the opposite and took 
the side of “the most devastating cyberattack in history” over antivirus 
software trying to stop it would be a non-starter.54  
 
These are easy cases because the costs and benefits are so lopsided: 
one of the two programs is all cost and no benefit. To be sure, in the 
blasted Fury Road hellscape that is Internet security, there is no 
shortage of obvious villains, and thus no shortage of easy cases. But 
not all cases are so easy. 
 
Compare a stereotypically Good program like Chrome Remote 
Desktop55 with a stereotypically Bad program like FlawedAmmyy.56 
The former is thought of as a useful utility that lets system 
administrators upgrade employees’ computers and provide tech 
support; the latter is thought of as a malicious “remote access Trojan” 
 
 
 
 
50 E.g., Rahul Chatterjee et al., The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence, in PROC. 2018 
IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY 441, 441 (2018), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stam 
p/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8418618.  
51 See generally MALWAREBYTES, CYBERCRIME TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES: RANSOMWARE 
RETROSPECTIVE (2019), https://resources.malwarebytes.com/files/2019/08/CTNT-2019-
Ransomware_August_FINAL.pdf; GAVIN O’GORMAN & GEOFF MCDONALD, RANSOMWARE: A 
GROWING MENACE (2012), https://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security 
_response/whitepapers/ransomware-a-growing-menace.pdf.  
52 But see Iulia Ion et al., “...No One Can Hack My Mind”: Comparing Expert and Non-
Expert Security Practices, in SOUPS 2015: PROC. ELEVENTH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY 327, 330-31 (2015), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2015 
/soups15-paper-ion.pdf (reporting that security experts are less likely to recommend anti-virus 
software than non-experts are). 
53 See Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in 
History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-
cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/AF6Y-EZWE]. 
54 Id. 
55 CHROME REMOTE DESKTOP, https://remotedesktop.google.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).  
56 See Proofpoint Staff, Leaked Ammyy Admin Source Code Turned into Malware, 
PROOFPOINT: BLOG (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leaked-
ammyy-admin-source-code-turned-malware [https://perma.cc/PQ66-G3U4].  
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used by hackers to steal data and spy on users. But they have 
substantially identical functionality: they let someone use a computer 
over the Internet as though they were sitting at the keyboard and 
looking at its screen. The difference is that people we call heroes use 
Google Remote Desktop to do good and people we call villains use 
FlawedAmmyy to do evil. 
 
It is not that there is no difference between good and evil online. It is 
just that the difference is not a purely technical one. Even in cases 
where the answer seems intuitively clear—surely Mozilla Firefox is 
Good and the Kazakhstani government’s surveillance scheme is Bad—
the clarity comes not from the functional characteristics of the 
software itself but from the context in which it is used. Firefox ships 
with over 150 certificates,57 and it has a feature to install more.58 The 
determination that the Kazakhstani government was up to no good 
with its ISP-supplied certificate rested on contextual knowledge about 
how it was likely to spy on users with the certificate, rather than 
anything inherent to the certificate itself. 
 
Like certificates, many programs are dual use: they have both lawful 
and unlawful uses. Remote desktop tools themselves are a good 
example: they are used both by actual tech support and by tech-support 
scammers.59 A program that deletes a remote desktop tool might be 
thwarting a crime, committing one, or both. Spyware often falls into 
this dual-use grey area: it is marketed as being for families wanting to 
keep in touch with each other, with a wink-wink nudge-nudge 
understanding that some actual uses will be less benign.60 
 
 
 
 
57 See Mozilla Included CA Certificate List, MOZILLA WIKI, 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Included_Certificates (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).  
58 See Setting Up Certificate Authorities (CAs) in Firefox, MOZILLA SUPPORT, 
https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/setting-certificate-authorities-firefox 
[https://perma.cc/86MU-AVB4].  
59 See MICROSOFT, GLOBAL TECH SUPPORT SCAM RESEARCH 2, 4-5 (2018), 
https://news.microsoft.com/uploads/prod/sites/358/2018/10/Global-Results-Tech-Support-
Scam-Research-2018.pdf.  
60 See, e.g., Complaint at 2-4, In re Retina-X Studios, LLC, No. 1723118 (F.T.C. filed Oct. 7, 
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_3118-retina-
x_studios_complaint_updated.pdf.  
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Nor does it help to rely on institutional identity. Obscure lone wolves 
can produce Good software—some of the Internet’s most essential 
infrastructure is written and maintained by individual volunteers.61 On 
the other hand, major corporations can produce Bad software. The 
Sony/BMG rootkit is a prime example of software from a Fortune 500 
company that intentionally introduced egregious security violations to 
users’ computers. One of the world’s leading antivirus makers, the 
Russian cybersecurity company Kaspersky, has been accused of using 
its antivirus software to exfiltrate classified documents from the U.S. 
government.62 
 
In some cases, “Good” and “Bad” are themselves contested. For many 
copyright owners, it is obvious that DRM is Good and circumvention 
tools are Bad; many open-source advocates and copyright skeptics 
would say exactly the opposite. Some people think that it is fine to 
play World of Warcraft with bots; others vehemently disagree. 
Advertisers and adblockers have conflicting views about the legality 
and morality of viewing content without the accompanying ads. (The 
CEO of Turner Broadcasting once said that viewers make a “contract” 
with TV broadcasters to watch the ads and called skipping 
commercials “stealing.”63) This is not to say that one cannot 
coherently invoke Bad Software Is Bad to condemn cheatbots or 
adblockers. It is just that in order to do so one must first take a position 
on fiercely debated normative and policy issues. 
 
 
 
 
61 See NADIA EGHBAL, ROADS AND BRIDGES: THE UNSEEEN LABOR BEHIND OUR DIGITAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE (2017), https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/2976/roads-and-bridges-the-
unseen-labor-behind-our-digital-infrastructure.pdf.  
62 Shane Harris & Gordon Lubold, Russia Has Turned Kaspersky Software into Tool for 
Spying, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2017, 1:44 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-hackers-
scanned-networks-world-wide-for-secret-u-s-data-1507743874; Raphael Satter, Mysterious 
Operative Haunted Kaspersky Critics, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 17, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/a3144f4ef5ab4588af7aba789e9892ed. But see Catalin Cimpanu, EU: No 
Evidence of Kaspersky Spying Despite ‘Confirmed Malicious’ Classification, ZDNET (Apr. 
16, 2019, 6:31 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/eu-no-evidence-of-kaspersky-spying-
despite-confirmed-malicious-classification/. 
63 See Ernest Miller, Top Ten New Copyright Crimes, LAWMEME (May 2, 2002, 1:05 PM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20020604021107/http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php
?name=News&file=article&sid=198. 
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And even if the underlying principles are clear, in some cases their 
application will be muddled because both programs will be able to 
make out a claim to the same principle. Two pieces of ‘antivirus’ 
software may try to disable the other, each claiming that it is the real 
deal and the other is an impostor wearing a badly fitting antivirus 
mask.64 Which is which? The principle that antivirus software is Good 
and viruses are Bad is not sufficient on its own. Some people think 
RegHunter is a harmful virus; others consider it useful antivirus 
software.65 Up and down depend on where you’re standing. 
 
There is a running theme here. Bad Software Is Bad conflates the 
question of whether software is good or bad in general with whether it 
is good or bad for a specific user. Some users need remote tech 
support, others don’t. Some users want to block ads, others don’t. 
Surely, then, we have an issue of fact which users themselves are 
peculiarly fitted to determine. Our next theory does just that. 
 
b. Software Freedom 
 
Software Freedom, for our purposes, is “the freedom to run [any] 
program as you wish, for any purpose.”66 This is a straightforward 
 
 
 
 
64 See Enigma Software Grp. USA v. Malwarebytes Inc., 938 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2019); 
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F. 3d 1169, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2019). See generally 
Brett Stone-Gross et al., The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software, in 
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY III 55 (Bruce Schneier ed., 2012). 
65 See Enigma Software Grp., 938 F.3d at 1033, 1037. 
66 Free Software Foundation, What Is Free Software?, GNU OPERATING SYS.,  
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.en.html [https://perma.cc/SV3M-U6NY]. I am 
borrowing the term “software freedom” and this definition from the Free Software 
Foundation’s free software movement. Id. Although the idea of “free software” is most often 
deployed in the context of intellectual property restrictions on the use, modification, and 
distribution of software, that is principally because these restrictions have been the most 
salient. See generally COPYLEFT AND THE GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE: A COMPREHENSIVE 
TUTORIAL AND GUIDE (2018), https://www.copyleft.org/guide/comprehensive-gpl-guide.pdf 
(discussing the use of copyright licensing law to ensure software freedom). But 
philosophically, the ideas are broader and encompass any kind of restrictions on user freedom. 
See generally SAMIR CHOPRA & SCOTT DEXTER, DECODING LIBERATION: THE PROMISE OF FREE 
AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE (2007). I refer to “software freedom” rather than “free software” 
to emphasize that it is freedom to use the software, not the freedom of the software itself, that 
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negative liberty: users should be free to use any software they want, 
even if it interferes with other software. Programs have no rights that 
users are bound to respect, and neither do software vendors or third 
parties. The principle can be rooted in freedom of speech and thought, 
in economic liberty, or in users’ property rights over their own 
devices. But the upshot is the same: users can run any software they 
want, and the legal system will not attempt to stop them. 
 
A general principle that the law does not meddle in the affairs of users 
is easy to articulate and easy to administer. Users who want a program 
can run it. Users who don’t want a program can refrain from running 
it. Neither case presents a legal question. Similarly, if Program A 
disables Program B, it is no concern of the legal system. The fact that 
it did so presumptively reflects a choice by the user to run Program A 
knowing of its effects on Program B. Whatever Program B did, they 
valued it less than what Program A now offers. In fact, often they will 
have run Program A for the specific purpose of stopping Program B 
from doing something they didn’t want. Every time a user runs 
CleanMyMac to remove an old and unwanted program that is just 
taking up hard drive space, Software Freedom correctly says, “Move 
along, nothing to see here.” Virus, meet antivirus. Ad, meet adblocker. 
 
The clearest doctrinal expression of this deregulatory impulse is in 
Section 230(c)(2), which prohibits imposing liability for “any action 
voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material ... that the provider or user considers to be ... objectionable.”67 
The courts have held that this protection applies, for example, to 
antivirus programs that flag other software for removal.68 But 
numerous other doctrines have a similar effect, simply by making it 
hard to bring claims. For example, the creator of a disabled program 
typically lacks standing to raise a CFAA or trespass to chattels claim 
 
matters. See Benjamin Mako Hill, Freedom for Users, Not for Software, in THE WEALTH OF 
THE COMMONS (David Bollier & Silke Helfrich eds., 2014), http://wealthofthecommons.org 
/essay/freedom-users-not-software. 
67 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (1996).  
68 Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F. 3d 1169, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2019). But see 
Enigma Software Grp., 938 F.3d at 1035-37 (distinguishing Zango and holding that Section 
230(c)(2) does not apply when the removal is for “anticompetitive reasons”). 
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against the creator of the program that disabled it. It is the user’s 
computer, not theirs, and it is the user who gets to decide what 
software runs on it. Software Freedom also argues against the use of 
copyright to restrict software modifications, against legally mandated 
software updates, and against anti-circumvention law. 
 
It is illuminating to compare Software Freedom’s prescriptions with 
Bad Software Is Bad’s: 
 
● Bad Software Is Bad brims with unjustified confidence that it 
can distinguish software suitable for all users from software 
suitable for none, and so it pays no attention to individual 
users’ choices about software. Software Freedom, by contrast, 
eschews such distinctions and instead defers to users. The fact 
that a user chooses to run a program is sufficient evidence that 
the program is useful. Indeed, a user’s choice to run a program 
is constitutive of the fact that the program is actually Good for 
them.  
 
● Bad Software Is Bad is not capable of staying its hand in cases 
where users disagree on the right outcome, but Software 
Freedom is. It is not trademark infringement for a website to 
set cookies in a browser, but neither is it trademark 
infringement for the browser to clear them. Both “allow 
cookies” and “block cookies” are reasonable outcomes that 
reasonable users could choose. Software Freedom’s 
deregulatory approach creates a technical space within which 
genuine user choice is possible. 
 
● In some controversial cases, Software Freedom supports a 
program that does what its users want, whereas Bad Software 
Is Bad condemns it because it causes third-party harms. This is 
a straightforward clash of values; users’ interest in running 
DRM-cracking software runs directly up against copyright 
owners’ interest in using DRM software to limit access to 
copyrighted works. That is, Software Freedom’s user focus has 
a specifically libertarian bent toward maximal freedom of 
action, whereas Bad Software Is Bad has a more 
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communitarian bent. The proper balance between these two 
incomparable principles is a question of policy. 
 
● Bad Software Is Bad can also be deployed paternalistically to 
prevent users from running software on the grounds that doing 
so will be bad for them. You may think you want to cheat at 
World of Warcraft, but think again: winners never cheat, and 
cheaters never win. Or, perhaps more persuasively, you may 
think you want to allow this person from “Windows Tech 
Support” full access to your computer, but think again. 
Software Freedom is an appealing principle if you think that 
users make good decisions. But if not, then Bad Software Is 
Bad can help protect them in a way that Software Freedom 
cannot. 
 
● In many easy cases, both theories reach the same clearly right 
result, because users’ goals and regulators’ goals align. 
Antivirus software generally does what users want and is good 
for them. Software libertarianism and software paternalism 
converge. 
 
So far, I have situated Software Freedom in contrast to Bad Software 
Is Bad: deregulation versus regulation, with the predictable tensions 
and tradeoffs involved. But just as the contestability of the definition 
of “Bad” software undermines the foundations of Bad Software Is 
Bad, there is also an instability in the foundations of Software 
Freedom. 
 
One way to get at the issue is the observation that Software Freedom 
risks turning users’ computers into free-fire zones: anything a program 
can get away with is permitted. One baleful consequence is that it 
encourages software vendors to engage in a technical arms race of 
escalating self-help. If Program A sends one of Program B’s modules 
to the hospital, Program B may respond by sending one of Program 
A’s to the morgue. This escalation is wasteful, as all unchecked arms 
races are. For example, Software Freedom makes no effort to end the 
cookie-blocking wars: blocking cookies looks like an exercise of user 
freedom, and so do the workarounds websites use to get around cookie 
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blocking. The user who visits one of these websites has chosen to run a 
program—the website’s workaround—that interferes with another 
program—the cookie blocker. So be it. No matter how irrational it 
may appear to run mutually incompossible programs in endlessly 
alternating succession, Software Freedom offers no basis to second-
guess a user’s decisions. 
 
Software-versus-software arms races also cause collateral damage as 
uninvolved software gets caught in the crossfire. Cookie blockers 
interfere with websites that are just trying to add useful features, not 
track users.69 The Sony/BMG rootkit was so tenacious about installing 
itself in a way CD-ripping software couldn’t defeat that it created 
exploitable security vulnerabilities on users’ computers.70 
 
Nor, at the end of the day, will the “right” program always win the 
arms race. Users need good programs with guns to guard against bad 
programs with guns, but sometimes the bad programs have bigger 
guns. Software Freedom lets antivirus software delete malware—but it 
also lets malware delete antivirus software. By declining to step in, 
Software Freedom avoids thwarting user choices to run software—but 
by refusing to step in at all, it allows other software to thwart those 
choices. That outcome can be just as disempowering. 
 
The distinction that antivirus software protects files while malware 
deletes them is not one Software Freedom on its own is capable of 
making. Users sometimes type rm -r * to delete files in bulk. Indeed, 
it is central to the idea of Software Freedom that it rejects Bad 
Software Is Bad’s sharp distinction between “safe” and “dangerous” 
programs. Users sometimes work with dangerous programs, like 
amateur experimenters giving themselves fecal transplants.71 Indeed, 
 
 
 
 
69 See, e.g., Blocking Third-Party Cookies Breaks the Save Button, PLANAPPLE, 
https://planapple.uservoice.com/knowledgebase/articles/509652-blocking-third-party-cookies-
breaks-the-save-butto [https://perma.cc/PTU2-GFLK].  
70 See Mulligan & Perzanowski, supra note 35, at 1158-60. 
71 See Denise Grady, Fecal Transplant Is Linked to a Patient’s Death, the F.D.A. Warns, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/13/health/fecal-transplant-fda.html 
[https://perma.cc/9YNN-KC3J].  
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any sufficiently advanced exercise of Software Freedom is 
indistinguishable from a security hole. The ability to modify a system 
in deep and powerful ways is the hallmark both of freedom and of 
malware, just like the ability to pack a lot of chemical energy into a 
small volume is the hallmark both of batteries and of bombs. Android 
is both more extensible and more vulnerable than iOS. 
 
Indeed, Software Freedom even has trouble with the distinction that 
the user has voluntarily installed antivirus software but not the virus; it 
is precisely the refusal to second-guess the user’s actions that makes 
the pure form of Software Freedom so simple and administrable. The 
spear-phishing victim who clicks on an emailed link to open what they 
think is a website and turns out to be a spyware executable has 
voluntarily interacted with something, even if it turned out not to be 
what they expected. To distinguish the user who accidentally clicks on 
a malware link from a security researcher who deliberately runs 
malware on a sandboxed PC to study it, something more is needed. 
 
I hinted at this when I said that one might question Software Freedom 
if one thinks that users make bad choices. But the issue is deeper and 
subtler than that. Many things that happen on a user’s computer are 
not the user’s “choices” in any meaningful sense. Whether or not a 
program’s actions are the intended result of a deliberate exercise of 
user freedom is a question on which Software Freedom depends but 
cannot by itself answer, except by collapsing into the trivial claim that 
anything that happens on a computer is deliberate. (But when 
everything is deliberate, nothing is.) Software Freedom can distinguish 
between “allow cookies” and “block cookies,” because they have 
different results. But it cannot distinguish between “allow cookies” 
and “attempt to block cookies but fail.” The user’s intent is not always 
reflected in what actually happens on a computer—otherwise, it would 
make no sense to make computer misuse torts and crimes turn on 
“authorization.”72 Sometimes users are deceived about what a program 
will do. Sometimes they change their minds but lack the technical 
 
 
 
 
72 See James Grimmelmann, Consenting to Computer Use, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1500, 1501 
(2016). 
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skills to drag an icon off the desktop, let alone uninstall the program it 
represents. Sometimes they are confused about how programs will 
interact. And sometimes software makers lie about what their 
programs will do, or they install programs without even a semblance 
of user consent. 
 
To be useful, a theory of software conflicts must be willing to say that 
some software really is unwanted (as Bad Software Is Bad does) and to 
say that some software really is wanted (as Software Freedom does). 
But it must also have a workable test for saying which software has a 
user’s permission to run and which does not. A line must be drawn, 
and some principle besides “let the memory chips lie where they fall” 
is needed to draw it. Our next theory does just that. 
 
c. Click to Agree 
 
The standard approach to ascertaining user consent in the United 
States circa 2020 is contractual. Users agree to the terms of a contract, 
privacy policy, or other instrument when they provide a specific 
manifestation of assent to it after having been given notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to review its terms.73 Contractual agreement 
provides three mechanisms for affecting the outcome in software-
versus-software cases, along with a dog that does not bark in the night: 
 
● A user can assent to software’s actions: they agree that the 
software is allowed to do X and that they cannot sue the 
software maker when the software goes ahead and does X. 
Such terms can therefore be controlling if a user tries to 
object when software covered by such an agreement 
disables other software: having agreed to let us disable 
software, you cannot now object that we disabled it.  
 
● A little more subtly, the terms can help protect software 
against being disabled. A user can promise not to decrypt, 
modify, disable, or even reverse engineer the software they 
 
 
 
 
73 See, e.g., Meyer v. Uber Tech. Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 74-76 (2nd Cir. 2017).  
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are installing, giving the software maker rights against 
users who do. 
 
● More subtly still, the terms can help provide a foundation 
for a suit directly against the maker of the other software 
doing the disabling. For example, the World of Warcraft 
license agreement played an indispensable role in 
Blizzard’s suit against Glider.74 
 
● In theory, terms could also create contractual obligations on 
the software vendor’s part: for example, that it will not 
collect certain information from the user or damage her 
computer. In practice, consumer terms of service and end-
user license agreements typically disclaim all such 
obligations as far as possible. 
 
Call this standard approach Click to Agree: users and software vendors 
will be held to the terms of whatever contractual agreements they 
voluntarily enter into. There is a lot to be said for the standard 
approach. Most obviously, it is capable of drawing the basic required 
distinction between software installed with permission and software 
without. Typical antivirus software gets user consent to a license 
agreement; the typical virus does not. Moreover, the test is 
administrable. Although there is lingering judicial uncertainty around 
“clickwrap,” “browsewrap,” and other poorly defined terms, there is a 
clear pathway for a software maker to get legally sufficient user 
agreement: display an unambiguous call to action and require a 
specific click to agree. 
 
Click to Agree also does a reasonable job at boiling software conflicts 
down into a coherent doctrinal framework: identify the relevant 
agreements, read them, and apply their terms. One common thread in 
the large range of doctrines implicated by software conflicts is that 
many of them can be resolved by looking to user consent. 
 
 
 
 
74 MDY Indus. v. Blizzard Entm’t, 629 F.3d 928, 939-41 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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“Authorization” under the CFAA is consent.75 So is permission of the 
owner under trespass to chattels. Copyright and trademark 
infringement claims are defeated by licenses from the owner. And so 
on.  
 
Thus, Click to Agree solves the most obvious deficiencies with Bad 
Software Is Bad and with Software Freedom. Unlike the former, it 
respects different users’ different choices, so it can distinguish users 
who want cookie blockers from users who do not. And unlike the 
latter—or at least the latter without a more fully fleshed out theory of 
user choice—it defends actual users’ choices when they are under 
siege: malware installed without notice obviously fails. 
 
Unfortunately, Click to Agree still falls short as a complete theory of 
software conflicts. It generates answers, but often those answers are 
wrong. The manifestations of assent on which these “agreements” rest 
are fundamentally fictional.76 Terms of service, EULAs, privacy 
policies, and other such documents are unintelligible behemoths that 
no human would, should, or could read.77 The PDF version of the 
macOS Mojave SLA is 15 pages and contains over 9,000 words.78 
They are notoriously dry, and studies consistently find that extremely 
few people accurately understand what is in them.79 Whatever this is, 
it is not actual consent.80 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Grimmelmann, supra note 72, at 1501-02, 1521. 
76 See generally NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013); MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
BOILERPLATE (2013).  
77 See, e.g., Uri Benoliel & Shmuel I. Becher, The Duty to Read the Unreadable, 60 B.C. L. 
REV. 2255 (2019).  
78 APPLE INC., SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR MACOS MOJAVE, 
https://www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/macOS1014.pdf. The Central Pacific Railroad 
Photographic History Museum’s User Agreement is a mind-boggling 35,833 words. Central 
Pacific Railroad Photographic History Museum: User Agreement, CPRR.ORG, 
http://cprr.org/Museum/legal.html [https://perma.cc/PT8V-BCJL]. 
79 E.g., Ewa Luger et al., Consent for All: Revealing the Hidden Complexity of Terms and 
Conditions, in CHI2013: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 2687 (2013). 
80 E.g., Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1461 (2019). 
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In the standard bilateral context—user versus company—these 
concerns have been largely brushed aside. Most often, a user attempts 
to bring a class action lawsuit against a company for defective 
software in the face of an arbitration clause; most often, the court 
upholds the clause against a user who could have read it, even though 
they did not. Even if these agreements cannot be defended as 
contracts, there is nonetheless a defense of them as policy. This 
argument, frequently associated with Judge Easterbrook,81 points to 
the economic efficiencies of mass-market contracting for software and 
other digital products. It frankly accepts that the user “choice” for any 
particular term is fictional, and then accepts the fiction as a useful way 
of achieving a reasonable policy outcome.82 
 
But the fiction collapses in the software-versus-software context, 
where a user is caught in the crossfire between two dueling software 
makers. The policy goal of enabling mass-market digital contracting 
no longer does outcome-determinative work, and thus unmoored, the 
fiction of consent floats downstream like the barge Anna C, wreaking 
havoc as it goes.83 The formal test for binding “agreement” bears so 
little relationship to actual user choice that it produces results that are 
essentially arbitrary. 
 
For one thing, both dueling programs can meet the Click to Agree 
standard. Apple’s macOS installer has a gold-standard explicit 
clickthrough. So does Zoom’s installer. Apple reserves the right to 
install updates automatically; Zoom limits its liability to the maximum 
extent allowed by law. As far as Apple and Zoom are concerned, 
 
 
 
 
81 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.); Hill v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.). 
82 Interestingly, survey research indicates that laypeople generally have the intuition that the 
“fine print” is legally binding even when it is not (for example, when a contract was induced 
by fraud), Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer Psychology and the 
Problem of Fine Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), and that they regard even 
legally defective “consent” as actual consent, Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 
129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020). Follow-up questions show that they are capable of 
distinguishing between these borderline cases and paradigm cases of full and unambiguous 
consent. In other words, actual users approach boilerplate terms of service with more nuance 
than either courts or their critics. 
83 See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 158 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  
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neither of them is responsible for any damage resulting from their 
struggle. User “choice” here is a choice for deregulation à la Software 
Freedom, which is to say no choice at all. 
 
Apple and Zoom are both arguably Good software. But Bad software 
can meet the Click to Agree Standard, too. The FriendsGreeting virus, 
which emailed itself to everyone in an infected user’s address book, 
protected its author by making users agree to a EULA.84 This too was 
gold-standard consent: it used the standard Windows installer and the 
text of the EULA accurately described what it would do. Granted, 
sending an inane “greeting” to all of your contacts is something few 
rational email users would voluntarily do (that’s what Facebook is 
for). But on the formalistic view online contracting law takes of 
consent, that is irrelevant. Clicking is agreement. If the 
FriendsGreeting EULA is valid, anything can be: Bitcoin ransomware, 
spousal spyware, or a virus that makes your iPod only play Jethro Tull. 
These ought to be easy cases, and yet they are not.  
 
In fact, they are difficult cases for all three theories. They are difficult 
for Bad Software Is Bad, which cannot by itself explain why software 
that is harmful to many users is nonetheless appropriate for others who 
want to run it. They are difficult for Software Freedom, which cannot 
by itself explain why software some users want to run is nonetheless 
inappropriate for others. And they are difficult for Click to Agree, 
which cannot by itself explain which users truly want to run software 
when they click a button, and which do not. It is time to take a step 
back and ask why all three theories get into similar trouble. 
 
III. User Autonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
84 Ed Felten, Virus with a EULA, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Nov. 15, 2002), https://freedom-to-
tinker.com/2002/11/15/virus-eula/ [https://perma.cc/TF9E-36BN]; Robert Lemos, Greeting 
Card Virus Licensed to Spread, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 13, 2002, 4:00 AM), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20030207164353/http://news.com.com/2100-1001-965570.htm;  
David Mikkelson, FriendsGreeting.com Virus, SNOPES, https://www.snopes.com/fact-
check/friendgreetingscom/ [https://perma.cc/R3N5-4A8W] (last updated Jan. 27, 2008). 
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A theory of software law is also a theory of users.85 To say that a 
program should be allowed is to say that users should be allowed to 
run it; to prohibit a program is to prohibit them from running it. So to 
understand a theory of software law, we must understand how that 
theory thinks about users. 
 
a. Imagined Users 
 
Bad Software Is Bad’s imagined user is a passive consumer. Their 
welfare matters: users should be able to enjoy Good software and be 
protected from Bad software. But they can be limited to ordering off 
an approved menu of welfare-enhancing Good software. It is fine to 
treat users identically and make choices for them, because if they are 
allowed to choose software for themselves, some of them will make 
bad choices. In other words, a user’s freedom can be limited, even 
quite sharply, to limit harm to them and to others. 
 
Software Freedom’s imagined user is a romantic hacker.86 They are 
fully informed about all the software installed on their computer and 
all the software they are considering installing. They understand the 
interactions among programs well enough that even if they cannot 
predict what the programs will do under all conditions, they can at 
least make knowing choices in view of the possible consequences. In 
other words, they are a technically skilled user who makes rational 
decisions about how best to achieve their goals using software. 
 
There is something to both of these theories. Some users, some of the 
time, are passive consumers. They want to watch Netflix and play Call 
of Duty; they want one-click video calls; they want computers that 
work without effort or frustration. And some users, some of the time, 
 
 
 
 
85 Cf. Paul Ohm, The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1327 (2008); Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 347 (2007). 
86 This term, of course, is a reference to the figure of the romantic author in copyright 
scholarship. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS (1997); Peter Jaszi, 
Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of ‘Authorship’, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; 
Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the 
Emergence of the ‘Author’, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984). 
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are active tinkerers. They want to build their own PCs from parts, play 
Civilization in an Excel spreadsheet, stream music seamlessly between 
“incompatible” devices, and even occasionally to write their own 
printer drivers. Many users are a bit of both, depending on what they 
want to do at any given moment and what tools are available. Bad 
Software Is Bad and Software Freedom are heuristics for these two 
latent tendencies in every user; they are dueling canons of 
construction. Bad Software Is Bad is maximally majoritarian; Software 
Freedom is maximally individualistic. Neither of them is complete 
without the other, or without a theory to decide which of them applies, 
to explain when a user is trying to customize their computer and when 
they just want the factory default to work.87 
 
Click to Agree tries to fill that void. Its underlying theory of the user is 
a close cousin of the theory behind Software Freedom. Both of them 
defer to individual user choices in the name of promoting user 
autonomy. Both of them see users as romantic individuals who make 
informed and rational choices. There is a difference, however, and it is 
a telling one. The idealized user of Software Freedom exercises 
autonomy through actions; they install specific software to achieve 
their goals. But the idealized user of Click to Agree exercises 
autonomy through agreements; they enter into bargains to achieve 
their goals. The user of Software Freedom is technically sophisticated; 
they understand software and its consequences. The user of Click to 
Agree is legally sophisticated; they understand contract law and its 
consequences. The user of Software Freedom is maximally free in the 
moment: they always have the option to rip out their current software 
and replace it with something different and better. But the user of 
Click to Agree plays a longer game: to gain the things they value most, 
they are willing to bind themself to do certain things and refrain from 
doing others. The difference between these two theories is the 
difference between two libertarian ideals: the freedom to use one’s 
property and the freedom to enter into enforceable contracts.  
 
 
 
 
87 There is another relevant line, discussed above: the choice between individual freedom and 
third-party protection. See supra Part II.B. For now, let us regard this line as externally given 
or determined. We are interested in how to determine, within the category of software users 
are allowed to run, which software they want to run.  
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The difference is perhaps most clearly visible in their attitudes towards 
DRM. The ideal user of Software Freedom can rationally choose to 
install DRM-protected media and then install DRM-breaking software 
to decrypt it. But the ideal user of Click to Agree who installs DRM-
protected media and clicks to agree to its accompanying license is no 
longer free to install and run the DRM breaker. They have rationally 
traded away their freedom to do so in order to obtain the media in the 
first place. Having made that choice, they are committed to it. 
 
To sum up, these three theories are theories of the user in three 
different senses. Bad Software Is Bad is a theory of public policy: it 
describes what software would be best (for society) for users to have. 
Software Freedom is a theory of individual rights: it describes what 
users should have the freedom to do. And Click to Agree is a theory of 
consent: it describes what users have and have not agreed to.  
 
All three theories fail on their own terms: they provide implausible 
answers to questions within their domains. Bad Software Is Bad 
prohibits users from choosing to run software that it would be good 
policy to let them run. Software Freedom allows users the freedom to 
run software that makes their computers unusable. And Click to Agree 
often claims that users have made choices about software that they did 
not in fact make and would not willingly make. 
 
These theories all fail for the same reason: they are all incomplete on 
their own. Questions of software policy, user freedom, and user 
consent cannot be separated. There is no way to coherently describe 
what is good for users without taking account of what they want and 
what they choose, no way to describe what they want without taking 
account of what is good for them and what they choose, and no way to 
describe what they choose without taking account of what is good for 
them and what they want. To make sense of software conflicts, we 
need a genuine theory of user autonomy.88 
 
 
 
 
88 See ANGELA DALY, PRIVATE POWER, ONLINE INFORMATION FLOWS, AND EU LAW: MIND THE 
GAP (2016); Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Software Agents and User Autonomy, in 
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b. A Theory of User Autonomy 
 
What might a theory of user autonomy look like? Perhaps something 
like this: 
 
Software helps users achieve important life goals. These include 
finding a job, finding a spouse, making deals, making art, learning 
about the world, learning about themselves, participating in 
democracy, participating in fan culture, being amused, being inspired, 
connecting with old friends, and making new ones. Anything that 
matters to people, no matter how big or how small, they now do in part 
with software. A program is better when it tends to advance these 
goals, and worse when it tends to thwart them. Some uses of 
software—such as search—can promote a wide range of individually 
chosen goals. Other uses of software—such as intensive 
surveillance—start off in significant tension with user goals. 
 
Software can be helpful (or harmful) both directly and indirectly. 
Some software, like an email program or a drawing app, directly helps 
users achieve a goal (building meaningful relationships with others, or 
being creatively expressive). A program that plays a loud annoying 
noise is directly harmful. But much important software is helpful or 
harmful on a meta level. An operating system is helpful because it 
allows users to run other software like an email program or a drawing 
app, and a virus is harmful because it deletes emails and drawings. 
 
Users by definition delegate particular tasks to software. I have 
elsewhere described this delegation in fiduciary terms: programs can 
act as agents and advisors for their users.89 As such, users require both 
access to software and loyalty from their software. Access promotes 
 
AGENTS ’97: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS 
AGENTS 466 (1997); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 911-12 
(2014); see also GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); Sarah 
Buss & Andrea Westlund, Personal Autonomy, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (FEB. 15, 2018), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/personal-autonomy/. 
89 Grimmelmann, supra note 88, at 904-06. 
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software in general; loyalty distinguishes good software from bad. The 
tradeoffs are important: access-promoting measures can be bad for 
users if they undercut loyalty, and vice-versa. In particular, users 
frequently delegate to software the task of keeping them safe from 
other software. 
 
Users’ goals are diverse and highly individualistic. Different users 
want different things—both big (professional versus personal) and 
small (DC versus Marvel). So we must distinguish between programs 
that are better for users in general and programs that are better suited 
for a specific user. Of course, the two are related. On the one hand, a 
program’s overall general benefits are the aggregation of its benefits 
for specific users. On the other, if we know nothing more about a 
specific user, a program’s overall benefits provide strong evidence of 
the best default assumption as to whether the program is good for 
them. 
 
Different users’ goals can conflict. Resolving these conflicts is a 
central task of politics and policy. Wherever the limits are drawn, 
users’ autonomy is appropriately limited by other users’. This conflict 
cannot be evaded by saying that one particular person is “the user” of a 
program and their autonomy takes priority; any such claim requires a 
detailed articulation of why running the program falls within that 
person’s sphere of autonomy and no one else’s. For example, a 
program that runs only on a user’s own physical computer and does 
not communicate with other computers is less likely to have 
consequential effects for others. Thus, personal property ownership 
can sometimes be a plausible proxy for whose autonomy is at stake.90 
 
Users have different levels of technical skill. Even when pursuing the 
same primary goal, one user may prefer to rely on a program that does 
more of the work, and another to do more of the work herself. Some 
professional photographers do detailed retouching work in Adobe 
Photoshop; some amateurs click the “enhance” button in Apple 
 
 
 
 
90 See generally AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP: PERSONAL 
PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016). 
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Photos. Different software is better suited for users with different 
skills. This is an important axis for software conflicts in two ways. 
First, users can be more or less capable of understanding and 
managing the operations of complex programs with potentially serious 
and irreversible effects. More skilled users may not be able to achieve 
all of their goals as well if they are denied access to complex and 
dangerous programs—but less skilled users may be thwarted in their 
own goals if they are forced or nudged to use such programs rather 
than simpler alternatives. Second, users especially vary in their skill 
and interest in the domain of software conflicts itself: computer 
security. Some users benefit from manually managing multi-program 
interactions; some users benefit from delegating the details to 
software. 
 
User choice is an important component of user autonomy, for three 
overlapping reasons. First, it is constitutive of autonomy that one’s 
actions should be the result of one’s own choices. It might be better for 
a user to stop using Facebook, but this is generally not a decision that 
their operating system should make for them. Second, an individual 
user’s choices are strong evidence, often the best available, about their 
goals. The choice to install Minecraft rather than Fortnite, or vice 
versa, is not easily gainsaid on the basis that the user “really” prefers 
the other. And third, the aggregation of individual users’ choices is 
relevant evidence about users’ goals in general. Facebook, Minecraft, 
and Fortnite are all popular for a reason.  
 
The allowable scope of user choice is appropriately circumscribed by 
any limits on user goals. This is an analytically distinct issue from the 
next one: accurately determining what a particular user has chosen 
within that allowable scope. A rule that users may not remove DRM 
from copyrighted works does not require the fiction that users 
“choose” not to remove it. 
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User choice is a question of fact: what actions by a program are 
within the scope of the user’s consent?91 Regardless of whether one 
thinks that for moral purposes consent is attitudinal or expressive,92 for 
legal and policy purposes we should work with an authorization 
account.93 I prefer Tom Dougherty’s reliable evidence principle: “An 
action A falls within the scope of the consent that X gives to Y if and 
only if X is giving consent through behaviour B, and Y’s reliable 
evidence sufficiently supports the interpretation that X is intending to 
communicate authorization for A in virtue of B.”94 This evidence 
includes any evidence about X’s specific situation and communicative 
intentions, about consent-givers’ situations and intentions in general, 
and any relevant evidence X could acquire through due diligence.95 
 
Evaluated against this standard, clickthrough agreements and other 
standard formal indicia of digital consent are typically prima facie 
valid. The widespread use of such agreements establishes a general 
communicative norm that clicking constitutes agreement to whatever 
widely used terms are contained in them, even if the clicker has not 
inspected the terms and is unaware of the details.96 The basic argument 
 
 
 
 
91 This is most usefully phrased as a question of the scope of the user’s consent, rather than the 
presence or absence of consent. See generally Tom Dougherty, The Scope of Consent 
(unpublished book), https://sites.google.com/site/tomdoughertyphilosophy/.  
92 See generally PETER K. WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT (2004).  
93 Dougherty, supra note 91, at 92–102; see also RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A 
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986) (discussing consent as authorization). 
94 Dougherty, supra note 91, at 114. As Dougherty notes, Y may still sometimes act 
blamelessly even if X is not intending to give consent through B. Id. at 114. n.82. This is an 
important qualification, because misleading evidence can sometimes suffice to shield Y from 
legal consequences. See Joseph Millum & Danielle Bromwich, Understanding, 
Communication, and Consent, 5 ERGO 45 (2018) (discussing scope of communicated consent 
as a process of communication). 
95 Dougherty, supra note 91, at 108–34 (discussing evidence available to consent-receiver).  
96 But see Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning 
Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). Kar and Radin argue that the communicative norms 
of cooperative contract formation show that the parties to boilerplate clickthrough agreements 
lack essential “shared meaning” as to many terms in those agreements. But after more than 
two decades of widespread usage of clickthrough agreements, it is equally plausible to say that 
they have their own communicative norms, precisely because there are such widespread 
practices of presenting them and clicking to agree, sight unseen. My best understanding of the 
communicative content of clicking to agree is that it expresses assent to any terms in the 
proffered instrument that are of a type users generally would expect to be in an instrument of 
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that voluntary agreements are generally autonomy-enhancing for users 
is sound. 
 
That said, the validity of a formal indication of digital consent is 
defeasible. One possible reason is that a program’s behavior falls 
outside of the range of typical behavior users are accustomed to from 
similar programs using similar agreements. Thus, even though 
FriendsGreetings used a standard clickthrough installer and described 
its behavior in the agreement, it probably obtained invalid consent. Its 
spamming behavior was sufficiently unusual that it did not fall within 
the scope of user expectations, and this gap would have been apparent 
to a reasonable software vendor. The general communicative norm 
typically relied on for clickthrough consent was not applicable.97 
 
Other standard cases of invalid consent include incapacity, fraud, and 
duress.98 Where the reliable evidence would tell a reasonable software 
vendor that the “consenting” user is a minor, the clickthrough is 
presumptively invalid. This is obviously the case for many games 
targeted at children; many app stores have revised their in-app 
purchase options to create a clickthrough process that more reliably 
targets an adult owner of the account rather than the minor user.99 
Similarly, where the vendor has elsewhere misrepresented what its 
program does, or its interface deliberately conceals aspects of its 
functionality that would be material to a reasonable user, the 
clickthrough is presumptively invalid—even if the clickthrough itself 
is scrupulously accurate. The FTC gets this right in some of its 
enforcement actions against spyware: formal “consent” is ineffective 
 
this sort. One who clicks to agree may accepts arbitration and give the company a 
nonexclusive copyright license in any user uploads, for example—but not accept unusual and 
oppressive terms, like giving a company custody of one’s firstborn. 
97 See also Nathaniel Good et al., Stopping Spyware at the Gate: A User Study of Privacy, 
Notice and Spyware, in SOUPS 2005: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY 43 (2005). 
98 See WESTEN, supra note 92.  
99 See, e.g., Prevent In-App Purchases from the App Store, APPLE (Nov. 23, 2019), 
https://support.apple.com/en-au/HT204396. 
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when a program conceals from users what it will do to them.100 And 
where a vendor has reliable evidence that the clickthrough has not 
been voluntarily given—which may be the case for many spousal 
spyware apps—here too user consent is presumptively invalid.101 Note 
that in all such cases, other programs to protect users from these 
abusive consent processes are more likely to be acting consistently 
with user choice. 
 
General user goals are interpretively relevant to understanding the 
scope of a specific user’s consent to specific program behavior. 
Intrusive surveillance tools, for example, are significantly harmful to 
many users who run them, and helpful to very few. This provides 
strong probative evidence that users have not factually given 
substantive consent, even though they may have gone through a formal 
mechanism purporting to indicate that they have. Formal consent 
mechanisms have evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling functions to 
make indications of consent more reliable, but they must never be 
mistaken for consent itself.102 No legal formality can provide 
conclusive evidence on its own; fraud in the factum can never be 
completely discounted. 
 
Where one program interferes with another, the user goals that both 
programs serve or hinder are interpretively relevant. Bitcoin 
ransomware is nearly universally harmful, and thus nearly universally 
unwanted. (There are exceptions, like anti-malware researchers, whose 
goals are rare and unusual: to understand how the ransomware works 
so they can develop countermeasures.) This is so because the programs 
the ransomware interferes with are significantly useful for a wide 
range of important user goals. And in comparison with a normal file 
encryption utility, which can protect a user’s greatly valued privacy, it 
does not advance any user goals to be able to decrypt one’s files only 
on payment of a Bitcoin-denominated ransom. 
 
 
 
 
100 See, e.g., Press Release, F.T.C., FTC Brings First Case Against Developers of “Stalking” 
Apps, FTC (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/10/ftc-
brings-first-case-against-developers-stalking-apps. 
101 See, e.g., id.  
102 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).  
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Different consent processes produce different levels of evidence about 
user choices. The clickthrough is widely used for software installed on 
users’ computers by businesses, and for online services that require the 
creation of user accounts. But it is not the only option, and hardly the 
only one in widespread use. There are lighter-weight processes, like 
free-software licenses that grant unilateral permission subject to 
restrictions and do not require any specific act of user assent,103 and 
websites that assume user permission to set cookies and run in-browser 
scripts from the simple act of navigating to them. There are also 
heavier-weight processes, like additional clickthrough screens and 
checkboxes for important terms, interfaces that ask “Are you sure?” 
before taking significant actions, cooling-off periods, and even (gasp) 
requirements that users who want to agree must confirm their 
intentions in person, in the physical world.104 
 
Many expressions of user authorization are implicit: they are 
established by the actions a user takes, rather than by an explicit act of 
purely legal agreement. This is a normal feature of software—most 
uses of which would be utterly impossible without implicit prospective 
blanket consent. Good user interfaces are carefully designed so that 
users can predict the consequences of their actions; the “save” button 
saves and the “delete” button deletes. When we say that a user has 
“chosen” one of these consequences, we are really making a complex 
contextual judgment that the consequence is within the scope of the 
authorization the user gave through a long sequence of program 
actions—click here, scroll there, type this, click again, etc. The EU 
“cookie directive”105 (which is responsible for websites showing pop-
ups asking for user consent to use cookies) is silly because in the Year 
of Our Lord Two Thousand and Twenty cookies are everywhere and 
 
 
 
 
103 See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License 3.0, GNU OPERATING 
SYS. (June 29, 2007), https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html.    
104 On the interplay between technical design, notice, consent, and legal consequences, see 
generally WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN 
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (2018).  
105 Council Directive 09/136, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11.  
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have been for nearly 25 years. Consent to set cookies is implied from 
visiting a website using a browser. 
 
The converse is also true. Denials of authorization can also be 
implicit. When a browser or browser plugin blocks cookies, that is an 
implicit denial of permission to set cookies, and a website that 
circumvents this denial to track the user is acting without user consent, 
regardless of what its cookie directive popup says.106 Anti-adblocking 
popups, which prompt the user to disable their adblocker before the 
website will display its content, get this right: they ask the user to take 
a specific action—disabling their adblocker—that meaningfully 
betokens consent. 
 
This variation in user-consent mechanisms would be unnecessary 
unless there were a variation in the severity of program actions. More 
unusual and more potentially dangerous program actions require 
more specific user consent; less unusual and less potentially 
dangerous program actions require less specific user consent. Match-
three games and online banking apps need different levels of user 
consent. The same consent process that suffices to run an antivirus 
program is insufficient to run a virus. The question of whether a user 
has consented to a specific program action thus depends both on the 
action and on the consent mechanism, both on what users in general 
want, and on what this specific user has chosen.107 
 
In particular, the appropriate level of required consent typically 
increases with increased complexity and power. This facilitates user 
sorting based on technical skill and confidence. Command-line tools, 
programming development environments, and bulk-erase disk utilities 
are appropriate for experienced users and dangerous in the hands of 
inexperienced ones. Certifying oneself as an experienced user by 
installing them is sometimes an implicit consent mechanism: it may 
require a degree of skill and knowledge simply to make them work. 
 
 
 
 
106 See Mayer, supra note 23. 
107 For examples of programs that are “consensually” installed but may fail this test, see 
Nathaniel Good et al., User Choices and Regret: Understanding Users’ Decision Process 
about Consensually Acquired Spyware, 2 I/S: J. L. POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 283 (2006). 
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But once one has, there will be fewer checks to make sure that one 
really intends the result. (This is part of what makes scams that 
convince users to install and use such programs and operate them for 
the scammer’s benefit so insidious.) Jonathan Zittrain proposed 
dividing computers into a “green” portion with strong technical 
safeguards and a “red” portion where users could engage in riskier 
tinkering.108 The red/green distinction by itself is too simple to capture 
all of the nuances of software conflicts, but the core idea is sound: red 
programs and green programs need different consent processes. 
 
c. Freedom to Tinker 
 
This is, I admit, a complicated theory of users. But any less 
complicated theory will not work. We need all three heuristics, 
because each sees something the others do not. Bad Software Is Bad 
understands that software in general can be helpful or harmful; 
Software Freedom understands that users have individual needs and 
goals; Click to Agree understands that they make choices and 
commitments. Each heuristic informs the others. 
 
The picture of user autonomy that emerges is an appealing one. There 
are nice hints of it in another popular slogan about software users: the 
“freedom to tinker,” which Ed Felten defined as “your freedom to 
understand, discuss, repair, and modify the technological devices you 
own.”109 One way to understand the freedom to tinker is as a negative-
liberty synonym for Software Freedom: it prizes users’ freedom over 
third-party restrictions. But it also provides a positive vision of user 
 
 
 
 
108 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 155 (2008). 
Granular app permissions are a modern expression of this idea: they put speed bumps in the 
way of more powerful apps, so that it is easier to run a safer program. See Apple Developer 
Documentation, Protected Resources, https://developer.apple.com/documentation/ 
bundleresources/information_property_list/protected_resources. 
109 Edward Felten, The New Freedom to Tinker Movement, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Mar. 21, 
2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/the-new-freedom-to-tinker-movement/. See 
generally Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 563 (2016) 
(giving an eight-part taxonomy of the freedom to tinker, including both autonomy and liberty 
interests). 
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autonomy.110 First, it is explicitly justified as a user-autonomy project. 
Tinkering is essential for users to achieve important goals in a self-
chosen way. Second, it is attractively compatible with user diversity. 
“Tinkering” is at a relatively advanced level of Maslow’s hierarchy of 
computer needs. Not all users will tinker, but all of them should be 
free to. And third, the reasons commonly cited for promoting tinkering 
prominently include learning, research, and improvement of one’s own 
skills.111 The freedom to tinker is a way of helping novice users 
become more advanced ones. There is a feedback loop here: use 
improves competence, but competence is important to safe use. In this 
respect, the freedom to tinker embraces the intentional self-
development at the heart of a rich theory of autonomy. So if one is 
looking for a slogan to describe the vision of the theory of the user I 
have sketched, one could do worse than “Freedom to Tinker.” 
 
d. Apple and Zoom 
 
Return now to where we started, with Apple and Zoom. What do these 
various theories have to say about the situation? 
 
Bad Software Is Bad is of at least two minds. Operating systems are 
useful; so is videoconferencing software. macOS has helped millions 
of users accomplish something they want to do; so has Zoom. Single-
click calling is a useful convenience. So is having a computer that is 
secure against hackers and spies. Zoom balanced those equities in 
favor of single-click calling; Apple balanced them in favor of security. 
Neither is obviously wrong, but the fact that Apple’s upgrade secured 
users’ computers against other malware probably cuts in favor of 
Apple. (Note that this take does not really respond to users who 
genuinely preferred one-click calling and were disappointed to lose it.) 
 
 
 
 
 
110 In fairness, much of this positive normative vision is implicit in arguments for software 
freedom. One advantage of the “freedom to tinker” framing is that it makes this vision more 
explicit. 
111 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Generation C: Childhood, Code, and Creativity, 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1979 (2012); Samuelson, supra note 109.  
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Software Freedom, on the other hand, probably favors Zoom. Apple 
downgraded users’ computers and locked down macOS to remove 
features. Some authors call this kind of remote control “tethering,”112 
but this was more like a choke chain: Apple yanked it and cut off a 
feature that many users found useful. Users who preferred the 
convenience of one-click calling should have been allowed to keep 
using it. (Note that this take does not really respond to users who don’t 
care about the extra click but do care about not having their computers 
hijacked.) 
 
As for Click to Agree, Apple’s Software License Agreement for 
macOS 10.14 Mojave states: 
 
Q. Automatic Updates. The Apple Software will periodically 
check with Apple for updates to the Apple Software. If an 
update is available, the update may automatically download 
and install onto your computer and, if applicable, your 
peripheral devices. By using the Apple Software, you agree 
that Apple may download and install automatic updates onto 
your computer and your peripheral devices.113 
 
The conclusion here is straightforward: Apple had clear and 
unambiguous permission from macOS users to install its Zoom-server-
disabling update. But by this reasoning, Apple could have uninstalled 
Zoom entirely, server and all, or uninstalled it even if it had no 
security vulnerabilities at all, just because it competes with Apple’s 
own FaceTime—which suggests that Click to Agree is not really 
sensitive to the factors that make this a difficult case in the first place. 
 
By contrast, here is a sketch of the facts that are relevant to the Apple-
Zoom incident if we take the Freedom to Tinker view of user 
 
 
 
 
112 E.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Aniket Kesari, & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 
87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783 (2019); ZITTRAIN, supra note 108, at 101–10. 
113 APPLE INC., supra note 79. By way of comparison, the Zoom Terms of Service, ZOOM (May 
30, 2019), https://zoom.us/terms [https://perma.cc/B98C-EV3K], are drafted to restrict how 
users use the Zoom service, and have little to say about what users will do with the Zoom 
software. 
64 THE OHIO STATE TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16.1 
 
 
autonomy—including a few details I have sneakily held back until 
now. First, one-click calling is a useful convenience. Second, one-click 
calling into a call you didn’t plan to join is an unsettling prospect. 
Third, macOS applications do not typically install web servers; this is 
a very unusual feature. Fourth, users really, really, really don’t like 
having their computers hijacked. Fifth, Zoom did not describe the 
server or disclose the risks it presented, even in very general terms. 
Sixth—and this is new—macOS users can disable silent updates by 
unchecking a box in a system preference tab. Seventh—and this is also 
new—it is not hard to run a web server on a macOS computer. Apple 
sells macOS Server for $19.99,114 or you can install one of your own. 
(I am running one as I type this.) 
 
Put all of this together and the portrait that emerges of Apple’s view of 
macOS users looks something like this: Most users want to run 
applications like Zoom. They can. Users like the convenience of one-
click calling, but the security risks from running a secret web server 
are serious, and most users would give up the convenience if they were 
aware of the tradeoff. Most users were unaware that Zoom installed a 
secret insecure server, and so were unlikely to remove it on their own. 
Many users who are prompted to install an update delay it, sometimes 
for years. Some users run web servers on their Macs, but extremely 
few users (if any) use the Zoom server for anything besides Zoom. 
Some users are very concerned about closely inspecting any software 
updates. So: a silent background update patches most users’ computers 
in the way they would want if they were fully informed and given an 
explicit choice, without breaking any features explicitly relied on by 
users who run servers, and while giving users who don’t want forced 
downgrades a way to opt out of this one. 
 
All in all, this is a nuanced and respectful approach toward users. 
There is always a tradeoff between beneficence and respect, and 
Apple’s Zoom update handles that tradeoff in a thoughtful and 
defensible way. The only things missing are that Apple could explain 
 
 
 
 
114 See macOS Server, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/macos/server/ (last visited Feb. 5, 
2020).   
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this reasoning publicly in more detail, that it could give users more 
information up front about the option to disable automatic macOS 
security updates, and that it could provide users the ability to roll back 
unwanted updates after the fact. 
 
This approach shows how Freedom to Tinker both draws on and goes 
beyond the other three theories of software conflicts. Bad Software Is 
Bad explains why Zoom’s secret server is a danger that most users 
should be protected from. Software Freedom gives users who like the 
server the choice to keep it. Click to Agree provides a legal shield for 
the update. But Freedom to Tinker goes further in its willingness to 
look at users as actual people: people with differing goals and abilities, 
people who sometimes make choices and sometimes don’t, people 
who both rely on software to help them achieve their goals and need to 
be protected from software. 
 
This is the real point of the Freedom to Tinker user-autonomy theory 
of software conflicts. It is not something new and radical. Rather, it is 
a restatement—explicitly and in one place—of many widely shared 
assumptions and commitments about users and software. The everyday 
practices of the computer security and human-computing interface 
communities already reflect something like this understanding of users 
and the goals of responsible software. Something like Apple’s 
disabling of Zoom’s server—or any of a dozen other examples given 
above—is intelligible only against this ethical backdrop.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
I have focused on software conflicts for three reasons. First, they are 
surprisingly common.115 Looking at them together as a category yields 
insights that looking at them individually does not. Second, they call 
into question common legal heuristics for dealing with software.116 
These heuristics are problematic even in less controversial settings, but 
there it is easier to brush aside their shortcomings. Software conflicts 
 
 
 
 
115 See supra Part I.  
116 See supra Part II.  
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provide a setting where these failings are harder to ignore, because the 
heuristics give such obviously wrong answers. And third, software 
conflicts direct attention where it belongs: to user autonomy.117  
 
Software-versus-software conflicts cannot be coherently resolved 
without a good theory of user autonomy. Any theory of user autonomy 
hinges on a good theory of user consent. And any theory of user 
consent hinges on a factually and normatively rich understanding of 
what users do with computers and what they are trying to do. A legal 
realist might say that an informal and generally subconscious lay 
theory of user autonomy is actually doing most of the work in 
software-conflict cases already, so legal theorists should make that 
theory explicit, test its claims, and fill in its details. 
 
Consent is complex because life is complex. Software is complex 
because life is complex. Software law cannot escape being complex as 
well, because it cannot escape paying attention to the nuances of what 
users consent to.  
 
 
 
 
117 See supra Part III.  
